On average 8,000 pork derived products are annually confiscated by Customs and Border Protection at the United States (US) ports of entry such as international airports, harbours or mail offices. These swine products with unknown sanitary status could pose a risk for foreign animal diseases introduction into the US. This study aimed at analysing the risk of African swine fever virus (ASFV) and classical swine fever virus (CSFV) being introduced into the US through prohibited swine products carried by air passengers (PSPAP) and identifying locations and time periods at higher risk where and when preventive and mitigation measures should be implemented. Our results estimated that the risk for CSFV entry was seven times higher and further spread between US airports than for ASFV. Specifically, the overall mean annual probability of ASFV entry was estimated as 0.061 at 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.007, 0.216] while the probability of CSFV entry was estimated as 0.414 (95% CI [0.074, 1]). For both diseases, July and May were the months at highest risk for entry. For ASFV, the origin countries of those PSPAP that represented the highest risk (above 70% of the total risk) were Ghana, Cape Verde, Ethiopia and the Russian Federation, while for CSFV above 90% of the risk at origin was concentrated in the Dominican Republic and Cuba, followed by India, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and China. These results could be used to implement and feed real time surveillance systems, which could potentially help customs to increase the detection rate of smuggled products, indicating when and where to look for them.
| INTRODUCTION
The volume of smuggled and improperly imported agricultural products, including fruits, vegetables, plants, meat and animal products, arriving to the United States (US) increases every year (APHIS, 2012 [EFSA], 2014) or classical swine fever (CSF) if they eventually contact US livestock populations (Cowan et al., 2015; Mebus et al., 1993) . The value of US agricultural sector production (mainly composed of crop and livestock) is expected to be $407.8 billion in 2017, being $175.3 billion attributed to total animal/animal product cash receipts (USDA, 2017a) . Focusing on US pig/pork production, this sector is expected to contribute around $20 billion to the US economy (United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2017a).
Bearing in mind that the US is the world's third largest pig producer (more than 11 million tons of pork produced during 2016) and the world's second largest exporter of pork ($4.2 billion in 2016) (USDA, 2017b) , the introduction of those diseases would cause tremendous economic consequences due to trade restrictions applied after disease notification. As an example of this hypothetical situation, Rendleman and Spinelli (1999) assessed the social costs and benefits of ASF prevention in the US. Their results showed that ASF occurrence would cost more than $4.25 billion while the cost benefit ratio of an ASF prevention program would be higher than 450. These costs should be summed to a decline in prizes, decrease of consumers' confidence, direct and indirect costs of control and eradication and social consequences affecting farmers and thousands US workers directly and indirectly employed by livestock industries.
Aware of those risks, the US has several mechanisms in place to prevent the introduction of improperly imported animal-derived products through numerous controls, including checking of air passenger's luggage. If any animal products were found in the incoming luggage, information on such findings would be recorded and those products would be subsequently confiscated and safely destroyed (United States Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2011). However, the estimated detection rate of these products is relatively low, ranging from 10% to 50% depending on the source of information (Corso, 1997;  National Agricultural Biosecurity Center [NABC], 2004) . This means a large volume of prohibited animal products potentially contaminated with pathogens causing FADs or even zoonotic diseases, could be entering the US every day without being detected.
The possibility of animal-derived products infected with pathogens being introduced into the US have been identified in previous analysis as one of the highest risks for the entry of both FADs into the US [i.e., for CSF in National Agricultural Biosecurity Center [NABC] (2004) ]. In addition, several authors have detected those risks from products intercepted in customs. Specifically, zoonotic viruses were detected in bush meat brought by air passengers into the US (Smith et al., 2012) , foodborne pathogens were detected in 2.5% of food products confiscated in air passengers' luggage in Germany (Schoder et al., 2015) and in up to 54.9% of meat samples tested in a Spanish airport (Rodríguez-Lázaro et al., 2015) .
Given the importance of the swine sector in the US and the current distribution of several swine diseases such as ASF and CSF, this study aimed at analysing the risk of ASFV and CSFV entry (formerly named release) into the US through prohibited swine products carried by air passengers (PSPAP), identifying locations and time periods at higher risk where and when preventive and mitigation measures could be more cost-effectively implemented to increase the number of interceptions and reduce the risk of FADs introduction into the US.
| MATERIALS AND METHODS

| Models design
Two quantitative stochastic models, one for ASF and another for CSF, were built to assess the monthly probabilities of ASF virus (ASFV) and CSF virus (CSFV) entry into the US through PSPAP.
Country level for origin, and US airports for destination were selected as space units of analysis; and the seasonality of the risk was assessed by month. Risk models were developed in @RISK 7.5 (Palisade Corporation, Newfield, NY, USA) on Microsoft Excel 2007 ® and run 1,000 iterations using the Monte-Carlo sampling method.
Each quantitative model followed a binomial process according to the formula:
where N odm was the estimated volume (in kilograms, kg) of PSPAP introduced into each US airport through each international flight, per month and origin country (common for both models/viruses); and Pi vo was the estimated probability of at least 1 kg of PSPAP from each origin country to be contaminated with ASFV or CSFV (specific for each virus). The ∑ refers to the probability of entry considering all the different international flights.
Assuming that the probability of entry of both viruses is independent and nonmutually exclusive, the final probability of ASFV or CSFV being introduced into the US by PSPAP was calculated as
The specific details of each model component, the input parameters and data sources are explained in detail hereinafter. Specifically, we divided the explanation of the model into two modules: (a) volume of PSPAP (N odm ) and (b) probability of PSPAP being contaminated with ASFV or CSFV (Pi vo ).
| Estimation of PSPAP volume introduced into US airports per month and origin country (N odm )
The model structure and assumptions for the estimation of N odm was heavily influenced by the quality and completeness of the data available. Two main datasets were essential for the estimation of the PSPAP arriving into the US. Firstly, the data on the number of PSPAP confiscated in US destination airports by CBP was obtained from USDA/APHIS. The Agricultural Quarantine Activity Work Accomplishment (WADS) database contains records of the agricultural products confiscated in US ports of entry. Specifically, we received access to the records of swine products intercepted from January 2010 to March 2016. Only the records of confiscations from air passengers at airport controls were used in the analysis, which represent 45% of the total pork products intercepted during those years in all of the US. Those records included detailed information on the port of entry (name of the airport) where they were confiscated, month, year, mode of introduction and quantity (however, based on personal communication with DHS personnel, this last field was not reliable due to differences between points of entry). number of destination airports considered in this study was 87, corresponding to all US airports receiving international flights. The number of origin countries was 128, for which international flights to the US were registered during the study period.
The biggest limitation of the WADs database is that no information was available for the origins of those confiscated PSPAP. Therefore, in order to estimate the origin of those confiscations, we assumed that the origin of the PSPAP confiscated in each destination airport per month was proportional to the volume of luggage arriving at that specific airport from each origin country. Accordingly, we initially estimated the proportion of kilograms (kg) of air passengers' luggage arriving to each US airport from each origin country per month. For that purpose, we first parameterized the number of passengers arriving to the US via commercial flights per country of origin, destination airport and month using a normal distribution considering data of the last 6 years to account for trends and seasonal variations over time (period 2010-2016) . In parallel, as data on the actual weight of checked baggage per each flight was not available, the number of kg of checked luggage allowed per air passenger was estimated based on the free checked baggage allowance in the economy class of the three most important air carriers in the US (United Air Lines Inc., Delta Air Lines Inc., and American Airlines Inc.) which represented 31% of all international commercial flights arriving in the US from January 2010 to August 2016. The variability between baggage allowance per airline and origin region was considered, as this input was parameterized as a pert distribution defined by the data collected. The minimum value was assumed to be 10 kg (hand baggage only), while the maximum value was assumed to be the sum of the hand baggage (10 kg) and the maxi- were modified assuming an improvement in the probability of detection since 1997, and modelled using a triangular distribution (as detailed in Table 1 ), to estimate the probability of nondetection of PSPAP at CBP controls. Then, this probability was used to estimate the kg of PSPAP that escape controls and are effectively introduced into the US by air passenger luggage per month and country of origin. Figure 1 depicts and summarizes the structure of the component N odm of the model, which is equal for ASFV and CSFV models.
In addition, Table 1 describes in detail each model component, input parameters and data sources used to estimate the volume in kg of PSPAP getting into the US.
| Probability of PSPAP being contaminated with ASFV or CSFV [Pi vo ]
The 128 (2015); and (c) category "C" for countries officially free from infection. The probability of ASFV or CSFV infection was modelled differently depending on the aforementioned categories (see Table 2 ).
For all the categories, it was assumed that the probability of 1 kg of PSPAP being contaminated with ASFV or CSFV was equivalent to the probability of at least one domestic pig being infected in the country of origin. This is a conservative approach, as infected pigs are often detected by farmers and/or veterinarians before arriving to the food chain. However, considering that this model includes products arriving from any country of the world (including ASF and CSF endemic countries), where the capacity of the veterinary services is T A B L E 1 Description of input parameters, data sources and probabilities used for the estimation of the volume (Kg) of prohibited swine products carried in air passengers' luggage (PSPAP) introduced into airports of the US per month, origin country and destination airport 
extremely diverse, a conservative approach was assumed with the highest risk scenario. Similarly, no differences were considered between types of pork products. Virus survival and virus load in animal products vary depending on the piece of meat, time after the infection and processing with thermal/chemical treatments (Cowan et al., 2015; European Food Safety Authority [EFSA] , 2014). Unfortunately, as no information on the type of products was recorded in the WADS dataset, according to the principle of maximum risk or worst case scenario, all PSPAP were considered as potentially contaminated with ASFV and/or CSFV.
For category "A" countries, the probability of ASFV or CSFV infection per origin country was estimated using a beta distribution taking into account the potential number of nonreported infected pigs and the number of pigs monthly slaughtered in the country.
Specifically, the product of the apparent prevalence in the country by month, the duration of the infection (assuming that dead pigs do not go to slaughter) and the notification underreporting as previously In contrast, the probability of infection in free and neighbouring countries (categories "B" and "C") was estimated following a similar approach used in (Veterinary Laboratories Agency [VLA], 2004), by multiplying: the probability of an outbreak occurring in the country, the average size of the outbreak (number of affected pigs), the duration of the infection, the probability of outbreaks being undetected and the proportion of pigs going to the slaughterhouse that month.
The only difference is that for countries located in regions considered at risk due to the proximity to affected countries (category T A B L E 2 Description of input parameters, data sources and probabilities used for the estimation of the probability of prohibited swine products carried in air passengers' luggage being contaminated with ASFV or CSFV per origin country and month 
"B"), the probability of outbreak occurrence was 10 times higher than for free countries.
Some assumptions were done for countries with no detailed information available.
For three African countries (i.e., Guinea, Liberia and Ethiopia) as data on ASF outbreaks and pig population were not available, the median value of the probability of infection of the other affected African countries was used. As no data on CSF outbreaks were found for Indonesia and Philippines, the apparent prevalence was estimated as the average apparent prevalence in two neighbouring counties with similar pig production characteristics (i.e., Thailand and Cambodia). Figure 2 shows the structure of the component Pi vo of the model.
| Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analyses were independently performed for each model and/or virus in two steps. Firstly, the Spearman correlation coefficients (ρ i ) between each input and the annual probability of ASFV/ CSFV entry into the US were calculated. Inputs with ρ i ≥ 0.4 and contribution to the variance of the output above 10% were identified as the most influential parameters for each model. Subsequently, these inputs were analysed in detail using the advanced sensitivity analysis tool of @RISK 7.5 running 1,000 iterations for each scenario.
A total of 10 scenarios were assessed for each selected parameter, by changing the base values in 10 consecutive steps, from a minimum of 50% reduction to a maximum of 50% increase.
| Visualization of results
Maps showing risks at origin country and destination airport and connecting flights were created in ArcMap 10.3 (ESRI ® ) using the "XY to line" tool. Maps showed the annual mean risk of ASFV or CSFV at three levels: (a) origin country; (b) connecting flight; and (c) US destination airport, at 95% confidence interval (CI). Risks at origin country, flight and airport level were grouped into categories by using Jenks' natural break classification method (Jenks, 1967) .
Specifically, destination airports and connecting flights were divided into three categories while five classes were established for the countries of origin. For visualizing purposes, connecting flights representing 90% of the total risk were selected for final figures.
In addition, networks among origin countries and US airports per month and disease were drawn based on the obtained risk results by using visNetwork package (Almende & Thieurmel, 2017) in R software (R development core team, 2015). Connecting flights representing 90% of the total risk per month were selected to build final nets. Jenks's natural breaks were used to calculate cut-offs among categories.
| RESULTS
| Risk of ASFV entry
The overall mean annual probability of ASFV entry into the US through the introduction of potentially contaminated PSPAP was F I G U R E 2 Model structure for the estimation of the probability of prohibited swine products carried in air passengers' luggage being contaminated with ASFV or CSFV per origin country and month. This component, named Figure S2 ).
| Risk of CSFV entry
The overall mean annual probability of CSFV entry into the US through contaminated PSPAP carried by air passengers was estimated as 0.414 (95% CI [0.074, 1]) that approximately corresponds to one introduction of at least one PSPAP contaminated with CSFV every 2 years and a half. Therefore, the probability of CSFV entry is seven times higher than the risk of ASFV by the same pathway.
The risk of CSFV entry through PSPAP was more widely distributed than the risk of ASFV, with 79% of the total annual risk concentrated in six US destination airports; namely San Juan (Puerto Rico), West Palm Beach (Florida), Charlotte (North Carolina), Fort Lauderdale (Florida), Newark (New Jersey) and Cleveland (Ohio). The countries of origin of those PSPAP that represented the highest risk (above 90%) to the US were Dominican Republic and Cuba, followed by India, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and China, with May and July the months at the highest risk (Figure 4 ).
The flight routes that pose the highest risk for CSFV entry were highly concentrated in the Caribbean region. Specifically, the Dominican Republic was the origin country that represented more than 80% of the total annual risk followed by Cuba (around 9% of the total risk). However, the risk at destination airports was widely spread since flights from the Dominican Republic arrived at up to 31 different airports along the year. Figure S5 ).
| Combined risk of ASFV and CSFV entry
The combined probability of the risk of ASFV and/or CSFV entry into the US by PSPAP was estimated as 0. 
| Sensitivity analysis
Based on the Spearman correlation coefficients calculated, inputs strongly correlated with the final annual output (ρ i ≥ 0.4) and contribution to the variance of the output above 10% were selected for advanced sensitivity analyses. For ASFV model, the probability of not detecting PSPAP at customs, the individual volume (kg) of each PSPAP arriving in the US (V/PSPAP) and the probability of ASF infection in Ghana were the highest correlated input parameters of the model. For CSFV model, the probability of CSF infection in the Dominican Republic, the probability of not detecting PSPAP at customs and the volume of interceptions were the inputs selected for advanced sensitivity analysis. All selected inputs were positively correlated with the response variable.
The advanced sensitivity analysis revealed that for both models the individual volume of each PSPAP arriving in the US was the most influential parameter followed by the probability of not detect- | 173 be enhanced. Although international concerns are currently more aware of ASF risk due to its recent spread along Europe (Gallardo et al., 2015; Gogin, Gerasimov, Malogolovkin, & Kolbasov, 2013; WAHIS, 2017a,b,c) , our results suggest that the risk for CSFV entry into the US was seven times higher and wider spread among US airports than for ASFV. Our results identified later spring and summer months as the highest risk period for the introduction of both analysed viruses into the US. However, while
July was the month at the highest risk of ASFV entry, May was the one for CSFV.
The risk profile of US strongly varies between destination airports, as well as between months within the same airport. For instance, Washington-Dulles airport (Virginia) was identified as the airport at highest risk of ASFV entry in the global annual assessment, but San Juan airport (Puerto Rico) got the highest monthly risk of ASFV entry during May. The obtained results demonstrate how dynamic risks are, changing drastically among months and airports, and the consequent need for a flexible and adaptable risk-based surveillance system in place.
There is no systematic method for anticipating imminent threats from passenger hand-carries and checked-in baggage. Moreover, passenger baggage inspection is constrained by limited manpower resources and short inspection time; and, as a consequence, not every single piece of luggage entering into any country can be inspected, opened or searched for prohibited agricultural quarantine materials. As expected, the risk of introduction was higher during the months when the air passenger traffic is the highest (peaks of summer and Christmas/winter). However, this result did not consider the potential variations in the control efforts effectuated at customs to adjust to the variations of the passengers' flow. In case that those controls would adapt proportionally to the flow of passengers, the risk would result more stable along the months. However, if those controls are constant throughout the year, effectively, during the periods of higher flow of passengers, the probability of detection would be lower, and consequently, as pointed here, the risk of introduction higher. These results can be therefore applied to distribute the control efforts proportionally to the risk, reducing these high-risk period seasons. Thus, surveillance and control efforts could efficiently and effectively target scenarios at the highest risk, considering periods of the year, destination airports and origin countries, among others.
Outcomes obtained from risk assessment studies aim at identifying such sort of information. However, it is usually challenging for researchers to get access to or find the necessary data to perform analyses. As for any other kind of study, quality of data limits and interferes in the accuracy of obtained results. Information on the actual weight of checked baggage per passenger, as well as data on demographic characteristics of the passengers (e.g., age, gender, nationality) and the characteristics of their travel plans (e.g., duration
and reasons for travel) were not available. Therefore, different behaviours (i.e., quantity and type of luggage, prohibited products carried) due to the passengers' and travel characteristics were not considered, resulting in possible over/underestimation issues. However, we conservatively estimated the quantity of luggage per passenger considering the variability between airlines and baggage allowance, Fortunately, information on PSPAP confiscated in customs was made available for our study. In this study, we only used the confiscation data from air passengers. Analysing other routes of introduction of PSPAP such as maritime containers, land or mail shipments, would help obtaining a more complete estimation of the risk of introduction of ASFV and CSFV into the US. ASFV and CSFV survival in pork products mainly depends on the piece and processing with thermal/chemical treatments (i.e., dried, cured, salted or smoked) (EFSA, 2014; Mebus et al., 1993) . However, no detailed information about the type and characteristics of confiscated swine product was available in the provided records. Therefore, every PSPAP was considered presumptively contaminated with ASFV and/ with both types ranging freely across geographical boundaries. Wild suids and free-ranging populations are able to spread diseases infecting other wild boar, feral pigs or even domestic pigs if biosecurity levels on farms are not properly in place (Blome, Staubach, Henke, Carlson, & Beer, 2017; Sánchez-Vizcaíno, Mur, Gómez-Villamandos, & Carrasco, 2015) . This route of infection has been already proven in Eastern Europe where ASF spread from Belarus and the Russian Federation to the European Union (Bosch et al., 2016 On the other hand, for CSFV the highest risk in origin was strongly clustered in the Caribbean. The biggest threat posed to US was the Dominican Republic (82% of the total risk in origin) followed by Cuba (10% of the total risk in origin). Controlling flights coming from these countries, but especially from the Dominican Republic, could considerably reduce the risk of CSFV introduction through PSPAP. However, flights from the Dominican Republic and Cuba landed at 36 and seven different airports, respectively. Considering these numbers, controls in origin could be a possible solution to reduce costs and manpower needed.
When comparing both models, 94% of the total risk for ASFV introduction was concentrated in five US destination airports, while for CSFV, this level of risk was split in 14 different airports. Therefore, this implies that an effective control at borders of CSF would be much more challenging and pricey for US border control services than for ASF.
The final goal of this study, similar to others conducted during the last years (Bair-Brake et al., 2014; Beutlich et al., 2015; De Melo et al., 2014; Rodríguez-Lázaro et al., 2015; Schoder et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2012) is to prevent the entrance of FADs, zoonotic agents and/or human pathogens important to public health via air passengers' luggage. To do so, obtained results should be communicated to risk managers and agencies in charge of international borders to inform the implementation of controls and more costeffective mitigation strategies. In addition, education and awareness are key strategies to make passengers understand the risk that introducing agricultural products into foreign countries could pose as well as the socio-economic repercussions that it could have if they were contaminated with FADs and effectively contact susceptible livestock populations.
Taking into account the availability of advanced technologies existing nowadays, these results could potentially be used to implement and feed real-time surveillance systems helping customs to prevent the introduction of prohibited products, informing about when and where they should look for them. This improvement in surveillance systems is needed since as was previously referred, only between 10% and 50% of improperly imported products are intercepted by custom officers (Corso, 1997; NABC, 2004) . In fact, the sensitivity analysis revealed that the likelihood of detecting smuggled products at the border controls was high positively correlated with the final risk. Therefore, small improvements in the detection at borders will strongly help to reduce the risk of viral entry. Similarly, the volume of products intercepted was also identified as a critical parameter in the sensitivity analysis. This reflects the need for analysing and considering other routes of introduction of ASFV and CSFV such as maritime containers, land or mail shipments, where the volumes of smuggled products are more likely to be higher.
| CONCLUSION
Two quantitative stochastic models were developed to assess the risk of entry of ASFV and CSFV into the US through PSPAP.
Obtained results showed that the risk of CSFV entry was seven times higher than the risk of ASFV entry. Over 90% of the final ASFV risk was concentrated in five US airports (Washington-Dulles, George Bush-Houston, John F. Kennedy-Queens, Warwick and San Juan) while the risk of CSFV entry was somehow more distributed (79% of the total risk within San Juan, West Palm Beach, Charlotte, Fort Lauderdale, Newark and Cleveland airports). The origin of the flights posing a risk for ASFV and CSFV was completely different.
Regarding ASFV, Cape Verde and Ghana represented the biggest threat for US airports. However, the Dominican Republic and Cuba were identified as the most likely route of entrance for CSFV. Interestingly, May and July were the months at the highest risk for both models. Information generated from this study could help to implement controls at customs as well as develop much more effective and cost-effective surveillance activities at borders to protect US livestock production. 
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